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kmk4@psu.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The past half century has seen dramatic transformations in many parts of the
world. Trade has been seen as a major factor in allowing remarkable rates
of growth in South East Asia. At the same time, large parts of the world had
stagnant real incomes. There was also a signi￿cant deterioration in the standard
of living in most former socialist countries which liberalized trade. Why has
the pattern of transformation been so uneven? Are there unexplored economic
factors that can help explain this? We argue that labor market distortions
present in transition and developing economies may provide an answer.
We develop a simple competitive general equilibrium model with two ￿nal
goods, one of which is indivisible,1 and labor which diﬀers in productivity. We
consider three kinds of economies: market, transition, and developing, with
diﬀerent institutional arrangements in the labor market. Trade can only improve
social welfare in a market economy. In transition and developing economies
social welfare may fall due to trade.
In market economies, workers earn their marginal product. In transition
economies, workers in indivisibles earn a common market clearing wage unre-
lated to their ability. This is meant to capture the idea that workers get a
common wage, especially in state owned sectors which make indivisible con-
sumer goods. As a result, low productivity workers who cannot earn more in
divisibles are attracted to indivisibles. These workers are paid more than their
marginal product in divisibles which makes the cost of producing indivisibles
higher than that in a market economy with the same technology. On the other
hand, the higher incomes earned by less able workers increases the potential
market size for indivisibles. Trade can reduce social welfare in such an econ-
omy when it involves importing the indivisible good. Such trade has adverse
eﬀects as it lowers production of indivisibles, which reduces wages, and hence
the ability to aﬀord the indivisible good.2 Loosely speaking, before opening
up to trade, socialist economies had a relatively equal distribution of income,
which, although not as high as in capitalist countries, allowed most citizens ac-
cess to simple consumer durables like ranges and refrigerators, though maybe
not cars. Opening up to trade resulted in such goods being imported rather
than produced domestically. As a result, labor allocated to manufacturing fell,
as did real wages there, so that few could aﬀord such goods! Liberalization and
welfare reduction went hand in hand.
In developing economies, family farming in agriculture is the norm. This
results in workers earning their average rather than marginal product in agri-
culture. In a developing economy workers in the divisible good sector, inter-
preted as agriculture, work in family farms and obtain the average product of
labor in the farm. When workers have diminishing marginal product in agri-
1Indivisibility refers to either zero or one unit of the good being purchased by a consumer.
As a result, the marginal rates of substitution between goods need not equal their price ratio.
2It also reduces price of indivisibles, which is bene￿cial. If the transition economy importing
indivisibles is large, there is no price eﬀect and trade is, in fact, weakly Pareto inferior to
autarky!
1culture, their average product exceeds their marginal product so that too many
workers remain in agriculture. In the development literature this distortion has
been linked with the concept of ￿Disguised Unemployment￿, see Sen (1960).
However, when labor is of diﬀerential productivity, as in our model, only lower
quality labor remains in agriculture. As a result, the marginal worker produces
more than the average product of labor in agriculture, so that too few workers
remain in agriculture rather than too many.
Low productivity workers who cannot earn more in indivisibles are attracted
to divisibles. These workers are paid more than their marginal product in
indivisibles which makes the cost of producing indivisibles lower than that in
a market economy with the same technology. Also, the higher incomes earned
by less able workers increases the potential market size for indivisibles. Trade
can reduce social welfare in such an economy when it involves importing the
divisible good. Increased output of the indivisible good reduces the labor force
and average quality of labor in agriculture, thereby reducing the earnings of
those in agriculture, and hence their ability to aﬀord the indivisible good.
Our work suggests that trade liberalization without structural reform can
have serious adverse eﬀects in transition and developing economies. An unusual
possibility is mutual losses from trade which occurs when a developing country
exports the indivisible good to a transition economy.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we develop the demand side of the
model. In Section 3 we solve for the autarky equilibrium. Free trade equilibrium
is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the eﬀects of land constraints, while
Section 6 contains some concluding remarks and directions for future work.
2D e m a n d
There are a continuum of individuals diﬀerentiated by their productivity, γ ∈
[0,1], and γ is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. There are two goods
in the economy, indivisible and divisible, and both goods are produced under
competitive conditions. The indivisibility assumption re￿ects the idea that the
good must be of a minimum size.3 We assume in the body of this paper that
the indivisible good is highly valued, i.e., all consumers who can aﬀord to buy
the good do so. We drop this assumption in the Appendix and show that the
basic results remain.
It takes one unit of eﬀective labor to make a unit of the divisible good which
i st a k e na st h en u m e r a i r e ,a n di tt a k e s 1
α units of eﬀective labor to make a
unit of the indivisible good. Consumers obtain utility V if they purchase the
3At low income levels, even clothing could be seen as indivisible good. One of the most
successful projects undertaken by the World Bank involved subsidizing purchases of wood
stoves. The initial cost of such stoves, around 10 to 25 dollars, prohibited their widespread
usage although they are more eﬃcient than native stoves made of mud. Although such goods
can be made divisible by renting or sharing, to the extent that it is more costly to rent
than buy and because of moral hazard problems involved in sharing, an essential indivisibility
remains.
2indivisible good, and obtain U(n) if they buy n units of the divisible good which
has a price of unity.
As indivisibles are highly valued all consumers with income exceeding P,
the price of the indivisible good, purchase it.4 In this manner, demand for the
indivisible good depends on the level and distribution of income. If there are no
factor market distortions, income is uniformly distributed over the unit interval
and the demand curve, depicted in Figure 1(a) by the line AB,i sg i v e nb y
Q∗ = 1 − P. (1)
Note that indirect utility jumps up at I = P from U(P)t oU(I − P)+V .
As a result, any change which involves raising the consumption of indivisibles
increases our utilitarian social welfare function.5
3 Autarky Equilibrium
In this section we outline the equilibrium in autarky for a market economy, a
transition economy, and a developing economy. In what follows the superscripts
M, T, and D denote values associated with market, transition, and developing
economies, respectively.
3.1 The Market Economy in Autarky
A worker with productivity γ makes γ units of the divisible good, which is the
numeraire, or αγ units of the indivisible good. In a market economy, workers
in both sectors are paid according to their marginal productivity. Hence, If
PM is greater (less) than 1
α, then only the indivisible (divisible) good sector
attracts workers. For both goods to be produced, as must be the case in autarky
equilibrium,




If α<1 then even the most productive worker cannot aﬀord the good when it
is priced at cost, so the indivisible sector is not viable. Given viability, equilib-
rium output is just the demand at cMand since some workers have an income
above cM, they demand some of the divisible good so that both goods must be
produced.





4This simple way of allowing income distribution to play a role is an advantage of our
model. Standard utility speci￿cations tend to either eliminate the role of income distribution
or become intractable as pointed out in the conclusion.
5Note that indirect utility is not concave in income because both the indirect utility and
the marginal utility of income jumps up at I = P making individuals risk lovers in this region
as pointed out by Ng (1965).






















1(c) - Developing Economy
1(b) - Transition Economy





















































=0 forα≤ 1 (2)
as depicted in Figure 2.
3.2 The Transition Economy in Autarky
In a transition economy we assume that all workers are paid the going wage,
w, independent of their ability6 in the indivisible good sector while each worker
earns the value of his marginal product, γ, in the divisible good sector. At
wage w, workers with γ>wchoose to work in the indivisibles sector, while
the others choose to work in the divisible good sector. An increase in the wage
rate attracts higher productivity workers into indivisibles and raises the average
quality of labor there.








while employment is w, and output per worker is αw
2 .L e tw(Q)b et h ew a g ei n






6The assumption that wages are equal across workers of diﬀerent productivities could also
be due to a complex technology which prevents piece rates, or other ways of tying earnings to
productivity, from being used.
5as depicted in Figure 3.
The unit labor requirement (the inverse of output per worker) times the




which also equals its price. Note that for the indivisible good sector to be viable,
we need cT ≤ 1,o rα ≥ 2.
The wage distortion in a transition economy aﬀects demand through its
eﬀect on incomes. When wages are zero, the demand function for the transition
economy is depicted by the line AB in Figure 1(b). If wages are given by wA > 0,
workers with productivity below wA, represented by the segment DE,w o r ki n
indivisibles. All of them are willing to pay up to wA for the indivisible good.
This causes demand to jump to the right at this price as depicted by the curve
ADEB in Figure 1(b).
Let ﬂ w be the wage needed to elicit the labor needed to produce an output
of unity, let Q∗T be the output level at the intersection of cost and the demand








and using (1) and (4) gives








=( cT)1/2(1 − cT)1/2 < ﬂ w (7)
as cT ≤ 1.
If the wage level weakly exceeds cost, then at a price of cT everyone is in the
market and in equilibrium the whole market can be served. If the wage is less
than cT, then only part of the market can be served.
There are three possibilities depicted in panels (a), (b)a n d( c)o fF i g u r e3 .
Either
(a) cT > ﬂ w>w ∗,(b)ﬂ w ≥ cT >w ∗,o r(c)ﬂ w>w ∗ ≥ cT, (8)
or correspondingly,







7Note that cost is independent of the wage. Cost is just the wage times the unit labor
requirement. As the wage rises, the unit labor requirement falls. In the uniform distribution
case, the two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other to leave marginal costs independent of the wage.
At wage w, the total value of the product is Pαw2
2 and total wage bill is w2. The value of the
product will not fall short of the total wage bill as long as Pα ≥ 2o rP ≥ 2
α = c. As a ￿rm
prices at cost, the value of output equals costs so there are zero pro￿ts.















































































7Equivalently, in terms of α this gives
(a) α<2,(b)2≤ α<4,o r(c) α ≥ 4. (10)
In case (a) the economy is not viable.8 In case (c), demand is unity even at
aw a g eo fw∗, and hence serving the entire market is the unique equilibrium. In
case (b) there are two equilibria: serving the whole market at the wage ﬂ w, or
serving part of the market by producing Q∗ with the wage w∗.
Lemma 2 In a transition economy, output is given by





= 1 for α≥ 2.
as depicted in Figure 2.
Proof. For α<2, costs of production in indivisibles exceed unity, the
indivisible goods sector is not viable, and hence QT(α)=0 .F o rα ≥ 4, serving
everyone is the unique equilibrium, so QT(α)=1. For 2 ≤ α<4,Q T(α)
takes two values: Q∗T(α)a n dQ = 1. Note that Q∗T(α) lies below QM(α) (the
analogous curve for a market economy).
3.3 The Developing Economy in Autarky
In a developing economy the traditional sector, agriculture, is organized on the
basis of family farms where workers share output equally.9 Thus, workers in
divisibles earn the average product there.10 As a result, more able workers
work in indivisibles while the less able remain in divisibles.11 Let ￿ γ denote the
marginal worker￿s productivity. Workers with productivities less than ￿ γ work
in divisibles earning
￿ γ
2.Aw o r k e ro ft y p eγ earns PDαγ in the indivisible good
sector. For both goods to be produced in equilibrium, as must be the case in





8It is possible to have a part served equilibrium if only part of the population demands
indivisibles, while all of it is active in the labor force. See Krishna and Yavas (2000) for details.
9We assume that the agricultural sector is one big family farm that produces the divisible
g o o d .T h i sa l l o w su st oa b s t r a c tf r o ma s y m m e t r i e sa n di n t e g e rp r o b l e m si nf a m i l ys i z e ,f a r m
size, and member ability. An alternative interpretation would involve identical family farms,
each with a continuum of members.
10Note that the developing economy diﬀers from a transition economy by wage equality in
indivisibles rather than divisibles. In both cases, the sector with wage equality attracts the
least able.
11Unlike the usual assumption in the disguised unemployment literature, the average prod-
uct of labor in agriculture falls as less people work on it. This is a consequence of constant
returns to scale and eﬀective labor being the only factor of production. This does not need to
be the case with a land constraint in agriculture as explained in Section 5.
8As in the transition economy the marginal worker in divisibles is determined







(1 − ￿ γ2). (13)
Rewriting (13) gives















As the output of indivisibles rises so does its demand for labor, and so ￿ γ falls
reducing the average product in the divisible good sector. The family farm
distortion aﬀects demand through its eﬀect on earnings. The earnings of a
worker with productivity γ are:







If a(Q)=0 , then the demand curve, depicted by the line AB in Figure 1(c),
is given by
Q∗D(cD,0) = 1 − 2cD.
If some workers are employed in divisibles, their average product is positive and
these workers are willing to pay up to a(Q) for the indivisible good. This causes
demand to jump to the right at this price as depicted by the curve ADEB in
Figure 1(c). The position of the jump depends on the value of a(Q), which in
turn depends on the output of indivisibles. As output in indivisibles rises, the
average product of labor in divisibles falls, so that this jump occurs at a lower
price. Thus greater output of indivisibles aﬀects its demand adversely!
Let ﬂ a = a(1), or the income level in divisibles when the output of indivisibles
is unity. Let Q∗D denote the output level at the intersection of the cost line and
the demand curve AB, and let a∗ denote the average productivity in divisibles
when output in indivisibles is Q∗D.F r o m( 15) it is easy to verify that a(Q)i s
downward sloping and concave. Moreover, that a(Q) ≥ 0a tQ = 1 if α ≥ 2.
If α<2, then a(Q) intersects the horizontal axis below unity. At Q =0 ,
a(Q)=1
2 and a0(Q)=− 1
2α. Hence, the a(Q)c u r v ea tQ = 0 intersects the
inverse demand curve but it is ￿atter. Figure 4 respects these properties.
There are three possibilities as depicted in panels (a), (b), and (c)o fF i g u r e
4:
a) cD ≥ a∗ > ﬂ a, b) a∗ >c D > ﬂ a, c) a∗ > ﬂ a ≥ cD (17)
In case c),a (.) lies above cD for all feasible consumption levels as depicted
in Figure 4(c). In this case serving everyone is an equilibrium. If Q = 1, the










4(a) - Part Served Equilibrium
4(b) - Part Served with Rationing Equilibrium










































































10demand curve facing each ￿rm is given by ADEB and when ￿rms price at cost,
all consumers purchase the good. It is also unique since at lower output levels,
a(Q) is even higher than ﬂ a and at a price equal to cost, all consumers can still
aﬀord to buy their indivisible good.
In case b), depicted in Figure 4(b), serving everyone cannot be an equilibrium.
If everyone is served then the average product in agriculture is ﬂ a which falls short
of cD. As a result all consumers cannot aﬀord to buy the indivisible good and
this cannot be an equilibrium. If, on the other hand, output is at the intersection
of AB and cost at Q∗D, then the average product of labor in agriculture is a∗
which exceeds cD, so everyone can aﬀord the indivisible and this cannot be
an equilibrium. Since price must be cD, the only other possibility is that the
equilibrium output level is where a(Q) intersects cD, that is the output at G,
and some consumers are rationed. At this output level demand facing each ￿rm
is ACFB. Some consumers (namely those with an income of cD) are rationed,
and a fraction GF/CF in Figure 4(b) cannot obtain the good. Since they cannot
aﬀord to bid up the price, this is an equilibrium.
In case a) only part of the market would be served as workers in divisibles
cannot aﬀord the indivisible when the indivisible output is Q∗. However, it
turns out that this case is never realized in our model.12
Since cD = PD = 1
2α and the highest income is 1
2,α>1 is needed for the
indivisible good market to be viable in autarky. By using (15) and (12) we ￿nd
that serving everyone is an equilibrium, i.e., ﬂ a ≥ cD for
α ≥ 1 +
√
2.
Otherwise, serving everyone is not an equilibrium and consumers are rationed.
In this event, output is implicitly de￿ned by
cD = a(Q).







12As shown below, a∗ is always greater than cD, and hence in our model we will never have
a part served equilibrium without rationing.
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11Lemma 3 In a developing economy, the output level is given by






α2) for1 <α≤ 1 +
√
2
= 1 for 1 +
√
2 ≤ α.
3.4 Comparing Autarky Outcomes
Since there is full employment in our model, output lies on the production pos-
sibility frontier. However, due to indivisibilities, the usual tangency between
indiﬀerence curves and budget sets need not occur. In addition both the tran-
sition and developing economies have factor market distortions which aﬀect
income distribution and hence demand for indivisibles as well as the cost of
producing indivisibles.
The factor market distortion in a transition economy results in an increase
in the cost of producing the indivisible. It also raises the productivity level
needed in the indivisibles for the market to be viable, and can increase market
size through its eﬀect on income distribution. Thus, the net eﬀect of the factor
market distortion in a transition economy could be an increase or decrease in
indivisible good output depending on productivity and the type of equilibrium
realized. The factor market distortion in a developing economy results in a
decrease in the cost of producing the indivisible and can increase market size
through its eﬀect on income distribution. As a result, in a developing economy,
indivisible good output is always higher than that of a market economy at any
given productivity level.13
Proposition 1 Output levels in three types of economies are de￿ned in Lemmas
1 −3 and depicted in Figure 2. The output of indivisibles in a developing
economy exceeds that in a market economy for all levels of α. Whether
the output of indivisibles in a transition economy is higher or lower than
that in a developing or market economy depends on α.
4T r a d e
We now consider the eﬀects of trade between economies with diﬀerent institu-
tions and productivity levels.
4.1 Pattern of Trade
Recall that costs are given by cM = 1
α,c T = 2
α, and cD = 1
2α for the market,
transition and developing economies respectively. Note that
cT >c M >c D
13Also note that the returns to ability rise fastest in a market economy suggesting that
the incentives to invest in ability improvements, like education, might be higher in market
economies.
12at any given α. The reason for this ranking is that in a transition economy,
workers in indivisibles are paid more than their marginal product in divisibles
which makes the cost of producing indivisibles higher than that in a market
economy with the same technology. In a developing economy, workers in divisi-
bles are paid more than their marginal product in indivisibles which makes the
cost of producing indivisibles lower than that in a market economy with the
same technology.
Given constant costs and perfect competition, the country with the lowest
cost exports the indivisible. Note that both technology and institutions deter-
mine this. The country with the best technology in indivisibles, i.e. with the
highest α, need not export indivisibles! For example, a developing economy will
export to a transition economy as long as 1
2αD < 2
αT , or 4αD >α T, even if
αD <α T.
4.2 Welfare Eﬀects of Trade
The eﬀects of trade on welfare are illustrated in Figure 1. In the market economy
trade results in a Pareto improvement as in the standard Ricardian model. In
Figure 1(a) the autarky price of indivisibles equals Oc. If trade causes the
market price to fall to OE, the economy specializes in divisibles and consumption
of both divisibles and indivisibles rises and welfare rises. Conversely, if trade
causes the price to rise to OI, wages rise in the same proportion as price in
order to keep price equal to cost as the market economy specializes completely
in indivisibles. As a result, the curve AB anchored at B s w i n g so u ti nt h es a m e
proportion as price so that all those who could aﬀord the indivisible good earlier
can still do, and all agents (except the former marginal agent) can aﬀord more
of the divisible as well. The presence of indivisibilities augments the standard
consumer surplus changes as additional consumption of the indivisible causes a
jump in indirect utility.
In addition to the price eﬀect which operates as in the market economy,
trade aﬀects the level and distribution of income in both the transition and
the developing economies. Exporting the indivisible requires more labor to be
employed in the indivisible good sector. In the transition economy this raises
wages from wA to wE in Figure 1(b), while it reduces earnings in divisibles
in the developing economy from aA to aE in Figure 1(c). These changes in
income can change the type of equilibrium in both countries. In a transition
economy, exporting the indivisible may enable the economy to switch to an
equilibrium where it serves all its consumers from one only some are served if
wE >c T >w A, as depicted in Figure 1(b). On the other hand, in a developing
economy, exporting the indivisible may move the economy from an all served
equilibrium to a part served one if aE <c D <a A as depicted in Figure 1(c).
Importing the indivisible good will have the opposite eﬀects.
Thus, the eﬀects of trade can be decomposed into two parts in economies
with a factor market distortion. The ￿rst is the standard price eﬀect which
bene￿ts all workers, and the second is via income. Trade unambiguously raises
the welfare of the high productivity workers via the price eﬀect, but may reduce
13the welfare of the workers in the distorted sector via the income eﬀect. If the
economy specializes in the distorted sector, the income eﬀect is positive, and
trade results in a Pareto improvement over autarky.14
4.2.1 Mutual Losses From Trade
It is easy to construct examples of trade between a transition economy and
a developing one which results in mutual losses from trade. Suppose that in
autarky all consumers are served in both countries. Thus, in the developing
country, ﬂ a exceeds marginal cost, cD, and in the transition economy, ﬂ w, exceeds
the marginal cost, cT. Suppose that cD <c T but close to it so that price eﬀects
are negligible. Since the developing country will export indivisibles, the income
eﬀects for both countries will be adverse. As a result, both lose from trade.15
5L a n d C o n s t r a i n t s
So far we have assumed that productivity does not depend on the size of the
labor force employed. This is equivalent to assuming that labor is the only scarce
factor. This may not be such an unrealistic assumption in land rich countries
such as the U.S. or Australia in the past century. However, in most settings,
especially in land poor developing countries, having fewer people in agriculture
(divisibles) raises the average productivity of labor.
Land constraints can be incorporated into our model simply by assuming
that the productivity of type γ in divisibles is γλ(Q)w h e r eQ is the output
in indivisibles. As Q rises, fewer people work in divisibles and λ(Q)r i s e s . I n
other words, there are external diseconomies of scale in the divisible good sector:
as labor used in divisibles rises, productivity of labor in divisibles falls. This
reduces the opportunity cost of labor and hence the unit cost of indivisibles.
Throughout this section we augment our notation using a subscript, L, to denote
variables in the presence of land constraints.
In this setting, land constraints, as modelled, leave the output of indivisibles
as well as the labor allocation between sectors in all three economies unchanged.
For example, an increase in λ swings the line AB in Figure 1 representing
productivity in divisibles out from its horizontal intercept at B. It also shifts
costs in indivisibles out proportionally since the opportunity cost of labor rises.
The average product curve a(Q) in a developing economy and its analogue,
the wage curve, w(Q), in a transition economy are similarly aﬀected. This
makes nominal variables change proportionally leaving the allocation of labor
and output of indivisibles unaﬀected.
14Note that trade may result in a con￿ict of interests even in a Ricardian setting when
workers have diﬀerent productivities and there are distortions in the factor market.
15One such example is αD =3a n dαT =6 .
145.1 The Market Economy Under Land Constraints
A worker with productivity γ earns γλ(Q) in the divisible good sector, and
αγP M




α which is also equal to marginal cost. Therefore both income















and (2) still gives the output of indivisibles.
5.2 The Transition Economy With Land Constraints













which is analogous to (3). The share of the labor force employed in this sector
is wL
λ(Q), and output per worker is αwL









)1/2 = λ(Q)w(Q)( 2 2 )
which is analogous to (4). Again both the cost and demand variables are mul-
tiplied by λ(Q) shifting both the demand and price lines proportionally.
Recall that our three cases in a transition economy were determined by
comparing cT to w∗ and ﬂ w. Since land constraints scale all three variables by
λ(Q), their relative ranking is unchanged for each α. This, together with the fact
that labor allocation is unaﬀected by land constraints, ensures that indivisible
good output is given by (11) as before.
5.3 The Developing Economy with Land Constraints
A worker with productivity γ earns αγPD












= λ(￿ γL)PD = λ(￿ γL)cD.
Since land constraints do not aﬀect the technology in the indivisible good
sector, the labor needed to make any given output of indivisibles in unchanged
so that ￿ γ(Q) ≡ ￿ γL(Q). However, the average product in the divisible good





Recall that equilibrium output in indivisibles in a developing economy in
the absence of land constraints depended on the relationship between a(Q)a n d
cD(Q). Since land constraints scale both a(Q)a n dcD(Q)b yλ(Q), their relative
ranking is unchanged for any given α. This, together with the fact that labor
allocation is unaﬀected by land constraints, ensures that indivisible good output
is given by (19) as before. Thus we have shown the following:
Proposition 2 T h ep r e s e n c eo fl a n dc o n s t r a i n t si nt h em a n n e rs p e c i ￿ed does
not aﬀect the allocation of labor across sectors and hence does not aﬀect
the equilibrium output of indivisibles under autarky.
5.4 Eﬀects of Trade
Although in autarky, land constraints aﬀect neither the type of equilibrium nor
the allocation of labor between the two sectors, they have profound eﬀects in
a trading equilibrium. With land constraints, exporting indivisibles becomes
more advantageous for all types of economies because producing more of the
indivisible good absorbs labor from the divisible good sector raising productivity
there, and this raises labor earnings in all three types of economies. If land
constraints are severe enough, exporting indivisibles raises social welfare even
for a developing economy.
In a developing economy with no land constraints, an increase in aggregate
indivisible good production reduces ￿ γ as the more productive workers go to the
indivisible good sector. With land constraints there are two forces at play which
determine the behavior of a(Q). As before, an increase in aggregate indivisible
good production reduces ￿ γ. On the other hand, it raises λ(￿ γ)a sλ
0(￿ γ) < 0. The






0(￿ γ(Q)) + λ(￿ γ(Q))
⁄ ￿ γ0(Q)
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depends on the elasticity of λ(￿ γ), or  , de￿ned to be a positive number. If this
elasticity is less than unity then average product of labor in divisibles will fall
16with increases in Q as before. If this elasticity is more than unity, then average
product of labor in divisibles will rise as Q rises. Note that this elasticity depends
on the severity of the land constraints, and that in a developing economy with
severe land constraints, an increase in indivisible good production raises the
average productivity in divisibles.
What have we learnt from adding land constraints? They may aﬀect techno-
logically identical economies diﬀerently as their output levels of indivisibles may
diﬀer, causing diﬀerences in the extent of land constraints in equilibrium. For
example, a developing economy produces more indivisibles than an otherwise
identical market economy in the absence of land constraints, i.e., QD >Q M.
As a result, less labor works in divisibles in a developing economy. If there
were land constraints, then the divisible good sector would be less crowded and
more productive in the developing economy, i.e., λ(QM) <λ (QD), which in
turn increases the cost of producing indivisibles in the developing economy.
As a consequence, land constraints have implications for trade patterns.
Although 1
α > 1
2α, it may be that cM
L (.) <c D
L(.). If so, the market economy will
export indivisibles. Note that as output in the market economy rises and that
in the developing economy falls their production costs in divisibles approach one
another. In this manner land constraints work against complete specialization.
While a developing economy would gain from importing the indivisible good
in the absence of land constraints, it may lose from doing so in their presence due
to crowding in agriculture reducing the average product there if land constraints
are severe enough. Thus, a land unconstrained developing economy gains from
indivisible good imports while a very land constrained one loses.
Proposition 3 With land constraints, exporting indivisibles becomes more ad-
vantageous for all types of economies. Social welfare in a transition or
market economy must rise as a result of exporting the indivisible good. In
a developing economy with severe land constraints, i.e., one with  >1,
exporting the indivisible good raises social welfare, while in a developing
economy without land constraints exporting the indivisible good may reduce
social welfare.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, industrial output and GDP fell
sharply at the onset of liberalization. There have been a number of interesting
hypotheses put forward to explain this phenomenon. These include slow adjust-
ment resulting in unemployment, see Gomulka (1992), investment delays caused
by the unwillingness to invest till a good match is found since investment is rela-
tion speci￿c, see Roland and Verdier (1999), and the disorganization hypothesis
of Blanchard and Kremer (1997), where strong complementarities between in-
puts allows suppliers to exercise their bargaining power and disrupt production
chains.
We take a diﬀerent tack. We argue that the organizational structure of
transition economies diﬀers from market economies. In particular, indivisible
17consumer goods like cars, refrigerators and other appliances are made in the
public sector where wages are not dependent on worker productivity. We show
that trade, in particular imports of indivisible goods, reduce public sector wages
and can result in signi￿cant welfare losses in general equilibrium.
Our model also helps explain why some developing economies gain through
trade while others do not. There are many reasons put forward to explain such
diﬀerences, see Krueger (1984) and Ray (1998) for an overview of much of this
literature. There is also a substantial literature on trade with factor market
distortions. Much of it focuses on minimum wages in manufacturing, see for
example Brecher (1974a,b) and Davis (1998). In contrast to this work, we focus
on a feature of the organizational structure of developing economies, namely
that the divisible good sector, agriculture, is organized on family farm lines.
We show that without land constraints, when it involves importing indivisible
goods, trade raises welfare due to advantageous wage eﬀects in agriculture. This
need not be the case in the presence of land constraints. This suggests why all
developing countries with a comparative advantage in agriculture need not gain
from trade. Our work suggests that land poor countries may lose from such
trade while land rich ones gain.
What is the role of indivisibilities in our results? Indivisibilities are not es-
sential in our model. Even without indivisibilities in consumption, trade which
involves importing the good made in the sector with the factor market distor-
tion may reduce welfare through its income eﬀects. We use the indivisibility
assumption for two reasons.
First, indivisibilities in consumption provide an easy way to characterize de-
mand as a function of income and its distribution.With the standard assumption
of identical homothetic preferences, demand depends on aggregate income and
is independent of its distribution. Quasi general equilibrium models with an
additive linear utility for the numeraire good remove all income eﬀects as they
fall on the numeraire good. If preferences are not identical and homothetic then
excess demand functions have few restrictions on them in general equilibrium
so that this approach is not tractable. Thus, our modelling approach provides
a simple way for income distribution to aﬀect aggregate demand.
Second, our model also provides a setting where the location of the factor
market distortion, in divisibles or indivisibles, matters. The astute reader will
have noticed that the factor market distortion in the developing and transition
economy is really the same. In the transition economy, w(Q) is the wage needed
to attract enough labor into indivisibles to make Q units of output in indivisibles.
In the developing economy, a(Q) is the average product of a worker in divisibles,
which equals his earnings, when enough labor is employed in indivisibles to make
Q units of output there. Without a distinction between the goods in the two
sectors, the eﬀects of such a distortion would be the same since the wage in a
sector with this distortion is increasing in the output of that sector.
The simple general equilibrium structure developed here also provides a way
to study a number of issues in trade and development. In Krishna and Yavas
(2000), we argue that technical change in a closed transition economy with
product market power may be immiserizing. In Krishna and Yavas (2001),



























we assume that the indivisible good is a consumer durable, and show that
endogenous business cycles are generically produced and that these cycles have
properties consistent with the data. We are currently working in several areas
where our set-up may shed new light on old issues. These include the role of
multinationals in development, and trade policy with product market power.
7 Appendix: Demand When V is Small
In this section we look at the implications of removing the large V assumption
for our results. We ￿rst look at the derivation of demand for indivisibles when
V is small. We show that while the details diﬀer from the large V case, the
manner in which demand is aﬀected by factor market distortions is unchanged.
Since costs and hence trade patterns are unchanged, the eﬀects of trade, though
less sharp, are of the same form as in the large V case.
Ac o n s u m e rw i t hi n c o m eI chooses what to buy to maximize his utility
subject to his budget constraint. Suppose that I ≥ P so that he can aﬀord the
indivisible good. Let U(.), depicted in Figure 5, be the utility obtained from
consuming the divisible good. If he buys the divisible good only he gets U(I),
while if he buys the indivisible good at a price of P, and spends the remainder
of his money on the divisible good he gets V +U(I −P). Thus, he is better oﬀ




U(I) − U(I − P)
P
. (23)
For the worker with productivity and income I,t h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f( 2 3 )
is given by the slope of the line AB in Figure 5. T h el e f th a n ds i d eo f( 2 3 )i s
independent of a worker￿s income and is given by the slope of the line 0C. As
19drawn, this worker is better oﬀ buying the indivisible as (23) is met. As income
falls, the right hand side of (23) rises due to concavity of U(.), and the analogue
to the line AB gets steeper until the two are equal.
Let i(P,V), implicitly de￿ned by
V = U(i) − U(i − P), (24)
denote the income level at which an individual is indiﬀerent between buying and
not buying the indivisible. Consumers with an income above this cutoﬀ level
strictly prefer buying the indivisible, while those below this cutoﬀ prefer not
buying the indivisible. Of course, a consumer may prefer buying the indivisible
but be unable to aﬀord to do so. Thus, a consumer will buy the indivisible only
if his income exceeds both the price and i(P,V). Let
￿ ı(P,V )=m a x {i(P,V),P}.
Thus, demand for the indivisible is given by
D(P)=1 − G(￿ ı(P,V )). (25)
Lemma 4 iP(P,V ) > 1, iV (P,V) < 0, iPP(P,V ) < 0.
Proof. Totally diﬀerentiating (24), gives




U0(i − P) − U0(i)
= 1 +
U0(i)











(U0(i) − U0(i − P))
2 < 0.
Figure 6(a) depicts the function￿ ı(P,V ). The corresponding demand function
is portrayed in Figure 6(b). When P is low enough, all agents prefer buying
the indivisible good so that in Figure 6(a), the vertical intercept of i(P,V )i s
negative. From this fact and from iP(P,V) > 1, it follows that i(P,V) lies
below the 45◦ line for low P and above it for high P. De￿ne ￿ P(V )t ob ew h e r e
i(P,V ) intersects the 45◦ line. Hence,
￿ ı(P,V )=i(P,V) if P ≥ ￿ P(V )
= Pi f P ≤ ￿ P(V )










































































21If G(.) represents a uniform distribution as assumed, then
DP(P)=−￿ ıP(P,V) < 0. (26)
DPP(P)=−￿ ıPP(P,V) > 0 if P > ￿ P(V )
=0 if P < ￿ P(V )
so that the demand curve in Figure 6(b), which represents the demand facing
the market economy described above, is convex above ￿ P(V ) and linear below it.
Since i(P,V)i si n c r e a s i n gi nP and decreasing in V ,a ni n c r e a s ei nV shifts
the i(P,V) curve in Figure 6(a) downwards and raises the intersection with the
45◦ degree line representing P. As a result, for V high enough, that is, when
￿ P(V ) > 1,i (P,V) never lies above P and we are in the large V case. Since
￿ P(V ) > 0, at a low enough price we are in the large V case. If P>￿ P(V ) then
we are in the small V case, and from (25) it follows that demand in the small
V case at a price P is identical to the demand from the same economy had V
been large and the price been ￿ ı(P,V). In other words, ￿ ı(P,V) can be obtained
by going vertically up from any point on the demand function in the small V
case to the demand function in the large V case. This is depicted in Figure 6(b)
for P = c> ￿ P(V ).
Hence, i(c,V ) plays the same role as c did in the large V case analyzed
above. The analysis proceeds as earlier with c replaced by i(c,V ).
The three possibilities in a transition economy, (a) unique part-served equi-
librium, (b) multiple equilibria, and (c) unique all-served equilibrium, are given
by the analogue of (8)
(a0)￿ ı(cT,V) > ﬂ w>w ∗(cT,V),
(b0)ﬂ w ≥ ￿ ı(cT,V) >w ∗(cT,V),o r
(c0)ﬂ w>w ∗(cT,V) ≥ ￿ ı(cT,V)( 2 7 )
where w∗(cT,V) is the wage required to elicit the labor needed when the output
in indivisibles is
Q∗(cT,V)=1 − GT(￿ ı(cT,V)). (28)
The three possibilities in a developing economy, (a) serving part of the mar-
ket, (b) part-served equilibrium with rationing, and (c) all-served equilibrium,
a r eg i v e nb yt h ea n a l o g u eo f( 17)
(a0)￿ ı(cD,V) >a ∗(cD,V) > ﬂ a,
(b0) a∗(cD,V) ≥ ￿ ı(cD,V) > ﬂ a, or
(c0) a∗(cD,V) > ﬂ a ≥ ￿ ı(cD,V)( 2 9 )
where a∗(cD,V) is the average product in divisibles when
Q∗(cD,V)=1 − 2GD(￿ ı(cD,V)). (30)
22A special case arises when U(.) is linear. In this case, it follows from (24)
that i(P,V)i sg i v e nb y
U(i)−U(i−P)
P = 1. If V
P > 1 then everyone is better oﬀ
buying the indivisible than not doing so, and will buy it if they can aﬀord to do
so. Thus we are in the large V case. If V
P < 1, then no one will want to buy the
good even if they could aﬀord so that there is no demand for the indivisible. As
a result, the demand curve is ￿at at P = V , zero above it and the same as in
the large V case for P<Vas depicted in Figure 6(c)16 by the solid line.
Note that in the small V case there is no discontinuity in indirect utility
at I = P, but there is a kink in indirect utility at I = i(P,V ) because the
marginal utility of income rises once the indivisible good has been purchased.17
As a result, indirect utility remains non-concave in income.
7.1 An Example













Setting i(P,V)=P in (31)g i v e s
￿ P(V )=1 – (1 − 2V )1/2.
Since ￿ P(V ) < 1, we choose the negative root.
Figure 7 illustrates possible cases in a transition economy as a function of
V and cT. The boundary between the large V and the small V r e g i o n si sg i v e n
by ￿ P(V )=cT,o r
cT = 1 − (1 − 2V )1/2.
For V a b o v et h i sl i n ew eh a v et h el a r g eV case and for V below this line we
have the small V case.
Consider the large V case. From (9) we know that if V is large, cT = .5
is the boundary between the region with a unique all served equilibrium and
region with multiple equilibria in a transition economy. Thus, above the line
where ￿ P(V )=cT and to the right of cT = .5, we have case b and there are
multiple equilbria. To the right of cT = .5,we have case c.








16As u ﬃcient condition to ensure that we are in the large V case is that V ≥ 1 since the
equilibrium price must always lie below unity.
17Ng (1965) argues that such kinks create a rationale for the risk loving behavior by the
poor observed in the demand for lottery tickets.

















and using this and cT = 2









Using (5) for ﬂ w, we can draw the boundaries of the three regions as de￿ned in
(27). Setting i(cT,V)= ﬂ w gives the boundary between the region with a unique







For V above the i(cT,V)= ﬂ w curve, all of the market is served and this region
is denoted by c0.
Similarly, setting i(cT,V)=w∗(cT,V) gives the boundary between the re-











For V below this curve, we are in case a0 and only part of the market is served.
For V between the i(cT,V)=w∗(cT,V) and the the i(cT,V)=ﬂ w curve, we are
in case b0.
24Plotting these using MAPLE gives these regions as depicted in Figure 7.
Regions labeled b and c correspond to the cases b and c in (9), and regions
labeled a0,b 0, and c0 to the relevant cases in (27).
Similarly, Figure 8 illustrates possible cases in a developing economy as a
function of V and cD. As before, ￿ P(V )=cD gives the boundary between the
large V and the small V regions. Recall that for large V , the boundary between
the all served equilibrium and the part served one with rationing is when c =
1
2(1+21/2), the vertical line at cD = .21 in Figure 8.
Evaluating (30) and (31)a tP = cD gives
Q∗(cD,V)=
2V
cD − cD − 1,
and using this and cD = 1













Now, we can draw the boundaries of the three regions as de￿ned in (29).
Setting i(cD,V)=ﬂ a gives the boundary between the region with an all












For V above this line, all of the market is served.
Similarly, setting i(cD,V)=a∗(cD,V)) gives the boundary between the
region with the part served rationing equilibrium and the part served equilibrium











1 − 8V +4 c +4 c2¢1/2
.
For V below this boundary there is no rationing.
Note that this boundary is not monotonic because for some V values i(cD,V)
and a∗(cD,V)) intersect twice. Plotting these using MAPLE gives the regions
as depicted in Figure 8. Regions labeled b and c correspond to the cases b and
c in (17), and regions labeled a0,b 0, and c0 to the relevant cases in (29).
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